Abusing SIP authentication by Abdelnur, Humberto et al.
Abusing SIP authentication
Humberto Abdelnur, Tigran Avanesov, Michael Rusinowitch, Radu State
To cite this version:
Humberto Abdelnur, Tigran Avanesov, Michael Rusinowitch, Radu State. Abusing SIP au-
thentication. Journal of Information Assurance and Security, Dynamic Publishers Inc., USA,
2009, Special Issue on Access Control and Protcols, 4 (4), pp.311-318. <inria-00405356>
HAL Id: inria-00405356
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00405356
Submitted on 20 Jul 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Journal of Information Assurance and Security 4 (2009) 311-318 
 
Received June 10, 2009                                            1554-1010 $ 03.50 Dynamic Publishers, Inc 
 
Abusing SIP authentication 
  
Humberto Abdelnur1, Tigran Avanesov1, Michael Rusinowitch1 and Radu State2 
 
1INRIA, Nancy - Grand Est 
Campus Scientifique - BP 239 - 54506 
Vandoeuvre-lès-Nancy Cedex, France 
{Humberto.Abdelnur, Tigran.Avanesov, Michael.Rusinowitch}@loria.fr 
 
2University of Luxembourg 
6, rue Coudenhove-Kalergi 
L-1359 Luxembourg-Kirchberg 
radu.state@uni.lu 
 
 
Abstract: The recent and massive deployment of Voice over IP 
infrastructures  had raised the importance of the VoIP security and 
more precisely of the underlying signalisation protocol SIP. In this 
paper, we will present a new attack against the authentication 
mechanism of SIP.  This attack allows to perform toll fraud and call 
hijacking.  We will detail the formal specification method that 
allowed to detect this vulnerability, highlight a simple usage case 
and propose a mitigation technique. 
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1. Introduction 
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is the IETF endorsed 
signaling protocol for VoIP. The developers of SIP leveraged 
well proven design concepts from HTTP to build a robust 
and multi-feature signaling protocol. The advance of highly 
dynamical services deployed over multimedia enabled 
networks and end user equipment had to be matched by an 
appropriate signaling protocol. At the basics, SIP allows to 
create, maintain and tear down a media session. The media 
session is represented by an RTP encoded audio/video data. 
The specific characteristics of this RTP flow are negotiated 
by SIP.  In the simplest case, the call establishment with SIP 
has to be able to let the two communicating partners send 
RTP data between their two locations. However, in the more 
complex case, some additional features have to be supported. 
Call forwarding is the simplest feature that has to be 
supported. Renegotiating media stream parameters (RTP) is 
also a minimum. For instance, in case of network congestion, 
another codec can be used. In order to support these features 
the so-called re-INVITE operation has to be used. The re-
INVITE is issued during an already existing session and in 
order to avoid a call-hijacking attack, the receiver is allowed 
to challenge the sender to authenticate. Ironically, it is this 
security feature that can be abused to bypass the 
authentication mechanisms used in SIP network. We will 
show in this paper why the re-INVITE operation is a major 
threat to any SIP network and how a simple grandmaster 
attack is possible due to it. 
We address in this paper one major vulnerability existing 
in the SIP specifications. This vulnerability can be used for 
massive toll frauds or caller impersonations. With all VoIP 
operators being vulnerable, the potential impact can be far 
reaching and important. We have developed a working 
prototype for practical assessment and formally proved it 
using automated constraint based verification. We have 
leveraged the AVIPSA tool for this purpose. 
To analyze the SIP protocol security we have used 
AVISPA, which is a state-of-the-art tool for automatic 
verification of security protocols. AVISPA is a push-button 
tool for the Automated Validation of Internet Security 
Protocols [1]. It provides a modular and expressive formal 
language, HLPSL (The High-Level Protocol Specification 
Language) for specifying protocols and their security 
properties, and integrates different back-ends that implement 
a variety of state-of-the-art automatic analysis techniques. 
Our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a short 
introduction to SIP and VoIP. The modeling of a subset of 
some functionalities of SIP is presented in Section 3. We 
propose a mitigation in Section 4 and a validation approach 
in Section 5 and discuss relevant works in Section 6. We 
conclude the paper in Section 7 with conclusions and 
pointers to future works. 
2. SIP Vulnerability 
SIP is located at the application layer of the TCP/IP model 
[3] and it has been designed to be independent of the 
underlying transport layers. It is a decentralized protocol, 
where the intelligence is distributed through the entities that 
the network is composed of. Thus, different components 
have been defined in the SIP architecture playing different 
roles in a deployed network: 
• User Agents (UA): they are the end-user devices in a SIP 
network (e.g. software or hardware phones). 
• SIP Location Sever: this server is used to store the current 
location addresses, features and other preferences of 
all the users from the domain. However, UAs do no 
directly interact with it but indirectly by means of 
proxies, redirect or registrar servers. 
• SIP Proxy Server: used to forward requests on behalf of 
other SIP entities. It can not initiate a request by 
itself, but can offer additional services like for 
instance security, authentication and authorization. 
• SIP Registrar Server: receives the request from a UA 
which wants to register in its SIP domain. 
• SIP Redirect Server: used to indicate the location where 
the initial request has to be forwarded. It is mainly 
useful for mobility purposes. 
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In fact, the servers provide a vast range of extra 
functionalities just to facilitate the establishment of a session 
between two SIP UAs. Only session signaling is considered 
by SIP, however it can be used in combination with other 
protocols to build a complete multimedia session. 
SIP is a Request/Response protocol. In a normal session 
many requests can be generated and for each one several 
provisional responses are possible and only one final 
response is required. 
Each request message of SIP, except CANCEL and ACK, 
can be challenged for authentication. Thus, the VoIP services 
can be protected against threats and attacks like 
impersonation, session teardown, fraud and others [13]. 
Authentication in SIP has also been leveraged on the design 
of HTTP authentication.  
When SIP is deployed without any underling 
cryptographic protection mechanism, the typical man in the 
middle and impersonation attacks between a caller and its 
proxy, (see Figure 1) are straightforward. However, to be 
mounted such attacks are constrained by some important 
factors. 
Firstly, the attacker willing to impersonate the user has to 
be in the middle of the session path and be able to 
manipulate the session traffic. 
Figure 1. Authentication  Attack 
 
Secondly, the attacker cannot trigger the user to make such 
a call at a specific time: he has to wait for such an 
opportunity. 
Finally, the attacker is restricted to use the generated 
response just to call the entity for which the user directed the 
call. In other words, the attacker is not able to call an entity 
of its choice. 
However, if the nonces are not correctly checked to be one 
time used, the third constraint could be relaxed since  
“... in SIP, a server MAY check that the Request-URI  
in the Authorization header field value corresponds 
to a user for whom the server is willing to accept 
forwarded or direct requests, but it is not  
necessarily a failure if the two fields are not 
equivalent.” [9] 
During a testing process [2] carried out by us, we have 
discovered a scenario in which  the user is reachable by the 
attacker and  the latest can trigger the former to generate an 
INVITE + credentials1 (directed to any target  destination). 
This allows an attacker to impersonate the user at the Proxy 
for any call. Therefore, the attacker can bypass the previous 
restrictions and make this attack a real security threat.  
The synopsis is as follows: an attacker will issue a call 
directly to the victim, the victim answers and later on, puts 
the attacker on hold (transfers him to any other place or uses 
any other method which requires a re-INVITE). Once the 
attacker receives the re-INVITE specifying the "On hold", he 
will immediately request the victim to authenticate. This last 
authentication may be used by the attacker to impersonate 
the victim at its own proxy. Section 3 formalizes and 
describes in detail this attack. 
Note, that to perform this attack, there are two headers in 
the INVITE message that are essential. 
The Contact header has to provide the destination that the 
attacker wants to call to, because, as specified by SIP [9] this 
information will be used to generate the message by the user 
agent. 
The Record-Route header specifies that all outgoing 
messages from the user entity go directly to that entity.  
3. SIP in AVISPA 
To analyze the security properties of SIP protocol, we made 
use of AVISPA, a state-of-art tool for cryptographic protocol 
verification. As an intruder model, it relies on the well-
known Dolev-Yao model [4]. This means that all the 
communication channels between agents (entities) are 
considered to be under the control of the intruder: the 
messages sent by an agent get immediately known to the 
intruder (this is a consequence of the eavesdropping 
capability of the intruder). Moreover, the intruder is able to 
drop the message from a channel and even forge another 
message and put it in any communication channel, i.e. send it 
to any agent (this is an active capability of the Dolev-Yao 
intruder). The deductive power of the intruder is quite 
natural: he can decompose a message (get every element 
from a list of values and decrypt encrypted messages under 
condition he possess the required keys) and compose 
messages (create a list from elements and produce an 
encryption with any key he knows). This model seems to 
give too much control to the intruder on the entire network. 
But the model is valid since it is possible to forge a Record-
Route header, an intruder may force an agent to send his 
messages first to a compromised router (or to the intruder 
itself) and this will give an opportunity to realize an attack. 
 Protocols to be studied by the AVISPA tool have to be 
specified in HLPSL (standing for High Level Protocol 
Specification Language). 
 HLPSL is an expressive, modular, role-based, formal 
language that allows for the specification of control-flow 
                                                        
1
 http://voipsa.org/pipermail/voipsec_voipsa.org/2007-
November/002475.html 
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patterns, data-structures, alternative intruder models,  
 
complex security properties, as well as different 
cryptographic primitives and their algebraic properties. 
These features make HLPSL well suited for specifying 
modern, industrial-scale protocols. For instance it has been 
applied to ZRTP flaws discovery in [7]. 
HLPSL is based on temporal logic. We specify a protocol 
by describing initial states and changes in states. A state is 
defined by an assignment of values to all the state variables. 
A change in states is describes by a transition predicate that 
relates the values of variable in current state with the values 
of variable in next or future state. We refer to the variable in 
next state as primed variables: for a variable X, X refers to 
the value in current state and X' to the value in the next 
state. 
3.1  SIP scenarios 
 We have formalized two typical scenarios of SIP protocol. 
In both scenarios Caller wants to call Callee. The first one 
is shown in Figure 2: Caller is registered on Proxy and 
wants to call via his proxy, and then Proxy requests an 
authentication of Caller. The authentication procedure is 
based on a shared between Proxy and Caller secret, 
generated during a registration phase which is out of scope 
of this article. If simplify, Proxy sends a nonce and Caller 
should return hashed value of that nonce concatenated with 
the shared secret and some other data. Meanwhile, Caller 
invokes a reciprocal authentication. With his authentication 
response, he sends another nonce to Proxy and expects a 
correct answer (proxy-auth-info) by the similar 
algorithm. 
The second case (shown in Figure 3): Callee is available 
only through Proxy where he is registered: any message 
sent to or sent by Callee comes first to the proxy. Caller 
establishes a conversation with Callee, and Callee puts it 
on hold by sending invite to Caller during the 
conversation. Having received this invite, Proxy can 
demand an authentication of Callee. The authentication 
steps here are similar to ones of scenario 1: Calee and his 
Proxy share a secret. If the response of Callee is valid, 
Proxy passes invite to Caller. In fact, the identity of 
authentication schemes in different scenarios admits an 
attack. 
3.2 SIP in HLPSL 
In order to describe the protocol we should specify the 
actions of each kind of participant, i.e. the basic roles. 
Roles are independent processes: they have a name, receive 
information by parameters and contain local declarations. 
Basic roles are played by an agent whose name is received 
as parameter. The actions of a basic role are transitions, 
describing changes in their state depending on events or 
facts. 
To describe both above scenarios in HLPSL we 
introduce three basic roles: caller, callee, and 
proxy. Each role is obtained by merging corresponding 
roles from the two scenarios defined in 3.1 (this means 
Caller from Scenario 1 and Caller from Scenario 2 
became one role which can execute both scenarios 
depending on received message, and similarly for Callee 
and Proxy). 
We present now the declaration of basic roles and their 
(typed) parameters in HLPSL: 
 
role caller(A,B,P : agent,  
 Apasswd : text, 
 SND, RCV : channel (dy)) 
…  
role proxy(P : agent, 
 Keyring : (agent.text) set, 
  Realm : text,  
     SND, RCV : channel (dy)) 
… 
 
 
Figure 2. SIP scenario 1 
 
 
Figure 3. SIP scenario 2 
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role callee(B,P : agent,  
 Bpasswd  : text,  
 SND, RCV : channel (dy))  
…  
 
Here we have:  
• A, B, P — agents playing roles caller, callee and 
proxy respectively;  
• Apasswd, Bpasswd — passwords of agent A and B 
respectively; 
• RCV, SND are channels for sending and receiving 
messages, and  
• Keyring — set of pairs < username, password >; 
• agent, text, channel(dy), (agent.text) set 
are the types. 
In HLPSL variable names start with capital letters; 
constants, keywords and types start with lower-case letters. 
3.2.1 Composed roles 
To execute several roles in parallel, the composition is 
presented in HLPSL. We defined two sessions 
(compositions): out_session (for a call by Scenario 1) 
and in_session (for a call by Scenario 2). This was done 
to simulate an execution of the protocol, i.e. to group several 
roles and share some parameters to execute the 
corresponding scenario. 
 
role in_session(A, B, P : agent,  
  Keyring: (agent.text) set,  
  Bpasswd : text) 
… 
    composition  
  caller(A,B,P, null, SA,RA) /\   
  callee(B,P, Bpasswd, SB,RB) /\   
  proxy(P, Keyring, realm, SP,RP) 
end role  
 
role out_session(A, B, P : agent, 
  Keyring: (agent.text) set, 
  Apasswd : text) 
… 
    composition  
  caller(A,B,P, Apasswd, SA,RA) /\  
  callee(B,P, null, SB,RB) /\  
  proxy(P, Keyring, realm,  SP,RP) 
end role 
 
Symbol /\ denotes here a parallel execution. 
Now we show the transitions of roles that are responsible 
for the authentication part (as more important one). A 
transition — is a rule that can be fired if the left-hand side 
(that is the part before “=|>”) is satisfied. 
3.2.2 Role caller  
The first transition of the role concerning authentication is 
 
getAuth.  
 State=10 /\ 
 RCV(A.B.CallID.auth.Algorithm'. 
   Realm'.Nonce')  
=|> 
 State':=20 /\  
 SND(A.B.CallID.ack) 
 
This transition is called getAuth and its left-hand side 
means:  
“if the value of variable State equals to 10 and we receive 
on channel RCV a message equal to the concatenation of the 
values of variables A, B, CallID, constant auth and 
three more values that are to be assigned to the variables 
Algorithm, Realm and Nonce”.  
The primed variable notation (e.g.: X') indicates that a 
new value is assigned to the variable. For example, a 
statement RCV(X) will mean that a message with value 
equal to the value of X (X was defined in this role before) is 
expected to be received via channel RCV, however statement 
RCV(X') would mean that any message (but with the same 
type as X, in the case of typed model) is expected to be 
received via channel RCV, and its value would be assigned to 
the variable X. 
The right-hand side of the transition means:  
“then assign 20 to the variable State and send via channel 
SND the concatenation of values stored in A, B, CallID 
and constant ack”.  
In other words, getAuth stands for getting a hash-
function name (Algorithm), a realm value (Realm) and a 
nonce (Nonce), and as a response caller sends ack2. 
Another authentication related transition is the 
sndResponce. In this transition caller emits an 
authentication response to proxy right after sending ack. 
As no message is expected to be received to fire this 
transition, a special constant start is used (it is simply a 
stub, as receiving of message via channel is mandatory for 
left-hand side of any transition in HLPSL) 
 
sndResponce.  
  State=20 /\  
 RCV(start) 
=|> 
 State':=30 /\  
 Cnonce':=new() /\  
 MdC':=Algorithm(Algorithm(A.Realm. 
  Apasswd).Nonce.Cnonce'. 
   Algorithm(invite.B)) /\     
 SND(A.invite.B.CallID.Algorithm. 
   Realm.Nonce.MdC'.Cnonce')/\ 
 witness(A,P, client_md, MdC') 
 
Here caller generates a new nonce Cnonce and 
computes a message digest value MdC (exactly like shown in 
HLPSL specification above). Then caller sends this value 
together with others. The last line is an authentication event 
witness. Here it should be read as follows: 
“agent A authenticates to agent P that the value MdC'3 is 
really generated by A for P”. The constant client_md is 
used to identify unambiguously a pair witness-request. The 
authentication-related event request will be described 
                                                        
2
 Notice: all the messages in our specification constantly contain from, 
to and CallID part. We omit mentions about this part 
3
 in fact, this is a message digest value 
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later. 
The getProxyAuthInfo transition checks 
authentication credentials received from the proxy. If it is 
correct — sends ack signal: 
 
getProxyAuthInfo.  
 State=30 /\  
 RCV(A.B.CallID.MdP'.ok) /\  
 MdP'=Algorithm(Algorithm(  
  A.Realm.Apasswd). 
   Nonce.Cnonce.Algorithm(B)) 
=|> 
 State':=40 /\  
 SND (A.B.CallID.ack) /\  
 request(A,P, proxy_md, MdP') 
 
Here we have the second authentication-related event 
request; it means “A accepts the value MdP' and relies 
on the guarantee that agent P exists and agrees with A on 
this value”. 
The witness-request pairs are used by AVISPA tool to 
detect authentication failures. If request is executed in 
one of the roles (by an agent who plays it), but corresponding 
witness was not executed, then it means, that the value 
whose authentication was requested was not produced by the 
expected agent. More information about HLPSL semantics 
can be found in user manual [1]. 
3.2.3 Role proxy 
Now we show some proxy's transitions responsible for 
the authentication procedure with Caller: 
 
getInviteSndAuth.  
 State=11 /\ 
 RCV(X'.invite.Y'.CallID') /\ 
 in(X'.PasswdX', Keyring)  
=|>  
 State':=21 /\  
 Nonce':=new() /\  
 SND(X'.Y'.CallID'.auth. 
   md5.Realm.Nonce')  
 
Transition getInviteSndAuth. At first we receive 
information about who wants to call (store it into the variable 
X') and to whom (store into the variable Y'). The next 
condition tells that X' should be registered in this proxy, i.e. 
the pair X.password_of_X should belong to the keyring 
set. This is achieved by using in(X'.PasswdX', 
Keyring) statement. Here we try to find value in set of 
pairs Keyring; as X' is already defined, so if there is a pair 
X'.something in Keyring, then the result of operator in 
will be true and the value of “something” is assigned to 
variable PasswdX'.  
 
checkAuth.  
 State=31 /\ 
 RCV(X.invite.Y.CallID.md5.  
 Realm.Nonce.MdC'.Cnonce') /\ 
 MdC'=md5(md5(X.Realm.PasswdX). 
   Nonce.Cnonce'.md5(invite.Y)) 
=|> 
 State':=41 /\  
 SND(X.invite.Y.CallID)/\ 
 request(P,X,client_md,MdC')  
 
Transition checkAuth checks if received authentication 
credentials are right and if they are, sends invite to the callee.  
 
sndProxyAuthInfo.  
 State=41 /\ 
 RCV(X.Y.CallID.ok) 
=|> 
 State':=51 /\  
 MdP':=md5(md5(X.Realm.PasswdX) 
   .Nonce.Cnonce.md5(Y)) /\ 
 SND (X.Y.CallID.MdP'.ok) /\  
 witness(P, X, proxy_md,MdP') 
Here we get ok from the callee and send a proxy 
authentication information to the caller. 
We skip the HLPSL-specification of the role callee and 
the rest of proxy's authentication related specification as it 
is very similar to the one described above.  
3.2.4 Role environment 
There is a special role environment, that it is a top-
level one (it is “called” from HLPSL file) where we declare 
agents and other constants, all the sessions to be executed 
simultaneously and where we define an initial intruder 
knowledge set using intruder_knowledge token.  Here 
we initially let the intruder know the following constants: a, 
b, p, c, invite, try, ringing, ok, ack, 
auth, in other words he knows all agents names and all SIP 
methods. 
To make AVISPA tool search for an attack, one should 
introduce a goals section to define security goals:  
 
goal  
 authentication_on proxy_md 
 authentication_on client_md  
... 
end goal 
 
For example, the first line is a command that makes 
AVISPA tool look for an authentication attack for the 
witness-request pair defined by constant proxy_md. 
Besides the authentication goals, it is also possible to define 
secrecy goals to check if specified value stays unrevealed by 
the intruder or by any other agent not allowed knowing it. 
Now we can start AVISPA Tool. An attack is detected 
when the following role composition is presented in the top-
role environment: 
 
proxy(p, Keyring, realm,  SP,RP) /\ 
callee(a,p, alice_passwd, SB,RB) 
 
And Keyring contains the only pair 
a.alice_passwd. But we can also use two defined 
compositions (which include necessary roles): 
out_session(a,c,p,Keyring,alice_passwd) 
/\in_session(b,a,p,Keyring,alice_passwd) 
3.2 MSC of the attack 
When running the AVISPA tool on our HLPSL 
specification of SIP we get the message: “UNSAFE”.  
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The tool automatically builds and displays the attack trace 
shown in Figure 4.  
Here x236, x265 and x237 are variables that can take 
any values. Notation Cnonce(7) indicates an instance of a 
Cnonce variable (the parameter is used to distinguish one 
instance of the variable from another). 
 We can see that at first the intruder impersonates a caller 
a when speaking to proxy. After getting an authentication 
challenge from proxy and sending ack, the intruder starts 
another protocol session with a. Here the intruder 
impersonates a proxy for a callee a. Once the intruder gets 
the necessary authentication response from callee a, he 
reuses it (the only change is CallID value) to answer proxy's 
challenge he got at the beginning. Here we get a security 
violation on authentication, as an appropriate witness 
event was not generated to match the request event that is 
produced. 
4. Mitigation 
Authentication challenges in SIP are computed using 
pieces of information extracted from the authenticate 
message plus the username and shared secret. In the simplest 
case the authentication response is computed by: 
A1  = username ":" realm ":" passwd  
A2 = Method ":" Digest-URI  
resp = MD5(MD5(A1) ":" nonce ":" MD5(A2)), 
where resp is the actual authentication response.  
Thus, the computed authentication response will be 
rejected if the method used for computing the response (i.e. 
the method value for A2) is different than the one in the 
challenged message.  
However, the described attack abuses that restriction due 
to the fact that SIP defines an INVITE method which can be 
used in different contexts (i.e. for initiation of a session and 
renegotiation). Therefore, the value of variable A2 is the 
same in both contexts. If different methods names are used 
for those contexts, then the generated authentication response 
is not suitable for such an attack. 
We propose a mitigation that consists in defining the re-
INVITE method as a proper method with a new name:   RE-
INVITE. Note that computed authentication for such 
message will use the RE-INVITE method in the variable A2 
rather than INVITE. Thus, it will generate an authentication 
token useful only for re-INVITEs messages. 
The proposed solution is simple and it should not require 
too many modifications in the complete protocol 
specification. 
5. Validation 
The proposed patch changes the Scenario 2 (see Figure 3) 
such that every invite appearing after comment “Callee 
presses hold” is changed to reinvite. So it is not difficult 
to change the HLPSL specification by taking into account 
Figure 4. Attack trace 
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the proposed patch. 
We ran AVISPA tool over “patched” HLPSL 
specification. For the patched version we got “safe” over the 
sessions which were unsafe in the original version. 
Tables 1 and 2 represent a comparative running time in 
seconds of AVISPA-tool with CL-Atse backend [1] and the 
result of safety analysis. These results depend on the roles 
executed in parallel as well as on the values passed to 
instantiate them. One of the important parameters is a 
database of registered agents for the proxy: the Keyring 
parameter. So, for every table we presented two different 
values of this parameter, whereas every table corresponds to 
the different set of instantiated roles executed in parallel. The 
set of instantiated roles of the first table is a minimal one to 
discover this attack, i.e. to find the attack we need these two 
instantiated roles to be executed in parallel: an instance of 
callee and an instance of proxy, where name and 
password of the agent playing callee are known by the 
agent playing proxy. One can find, that these instances are 
included in the set of instantiated roles presented in Table 2, 
if look at definition of in_session and out_session. 
Column sip contains results for the original version of SIP 
and sip' — for the patched one. 
 
Keyring sip sip' 
a.caller_passwd 0.07s, 
unsafe 
0.06s,  
safe 
a.caller_passwd, 
c.charley_passwd, 
i.i passwd 
0.07s, 
unsafe 
0.07s,  
safe 
 
proxy(p, Keyring, realm, SP,RP) 
/\callee(a,p, alice_passwd, SB,RB) 
Table 1. Comparison of results. 
 
Keyring sip sip' 
a.caller_passwd 0.39s, 
unsafe 
11.81s, 
safe 
a.caller_passwd, 
c.charley_passwd, 
i.i passwd 
0.40s, 
unsafe 
13785.07s, 
safe 
 
out_session(a,c,p,Keyring,alice_passwd) 
/\in_session(b,a,p,Keyring,alice_passwd) 
Table 2. Comparison of results. 
6. Related work 
The comprehensive overview on VoIP security is the 
reference [14] addressing the operational and deployment 
aspects of VoIP security.  The security mechanisms deployed 
in SIP are well described in [8] without covering the formal 
aspect of the security architecture. As of today, the security 
of VoIP (and SIP in particular) is still in the infancy. 
Although strong authentication and authorization 
mechanisms have been defined, the operational deployment 
is lagging behind. Simple man in middle attacks against SIP 
infrastructures not using cryptographic authentication 
mechanisms, have been known for a while and are easy to 
implement. Ironically, the security mechanisms that have 
been proposed to counter these vulnerabilities induce more 
serous threats, because the non repudiation properties are a 
side effect of the SIP authentication method. To our 
knowledge, no other previous works have identified such a 
vulnerability, where a feature interaction in the SIP is 
combined with serious attack against the SIP. 
Many works have been dedicated to analysis and testing of 
VoIP protocols, but dealing rather with the PSTN 
interconnection as in [11], or [10].  Most of the performed 
work has addressed the prevention of SPAM over Internet 
Telephony (SPIT) attacks [5] as well as mitigating denial of 
service ones (DoS) [12]. Very few of them did address the 
cryptographic analysis of the protocol itself. Among the very 
few which did, most of them are based on human-analysis of 
the protocol.   
As of today, very few works address the formal 
specification and analysis of security properties. Among 
them — a thorough study of ZRTP (VoIP media transport 
layer protocol) using AVISPA tool [7], has allowed to find a 
new authentication attack. There are two families of potential 
attacks that can be performed against SIP. The first class of 
attacks is possible when no cryptographic protections are 
used in the SIP deployment. For instance, a DoS attack on 
SIP protocol has also been exhibited using a Petri nets 
modelling in [15] — using faked BYE message and showed  
an established conversation can be turned down prematurely 
[6]. 
Until now, the authentication and authorization 
mechanisms in SIP were considered sound and such that 
only denial of service and brute force attacks were possible. 
The second class of attacks concerns poor implementations 
and/or efficiency driven fallacies in the authentication 
process. We have disclosed some attacks against specific 
implementations (CVE-2007-5468, CVE-2007-5469), where 
cryptographic tokens could be reused or even fixed, but these 
were due to software implementation flaws and not really 
SIP specification level vulnerabilities. Our paper is the first 
to show a structural flaw in the SIP authentication 
mechanism itself due to the feature interaction in SIP. 
7. Conclusions 
We have presented in this paper a new attack against the 
SIP authentication mechanisms. This attack is extremely 
dangerous since SIP is worldwide deployed and no solution 
to mitigate this attack exists as of today. With SIP being the 
de-facto standard signalization protocol in VoIP, the 
consequences are far reaching. These consequences of this 
attack can range from toll fraud, caller impersonation and up 
to massive deflected denial of service attacks. The essential 
weakness comes from a feature interaction between routing 
information and authentication logics. This weakness cannot 
be avoided, unless the SIP standard is changed.  This attack 
is practical on any VoIP domain and the expected impact 
quite dangerous. We have developed a prototype and 
evaluated in laboratory conditions the applicability of the 
attack. 
We have formally confirmed this vulnerability using the 
AVISPA tool and shown that extending SIP with one more 
operation can mitigate this attack. Our solution has been 
automatically validated by AVISPA. It is a follow-up 
activity to fully specify SIP and completely analyze its 
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behavior, but many scalability issues must be solved to 
achieve this task. 
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